We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the CournotNash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. r
Introduction
In a variety of settings, agents repeatedly interact and take irreversible actions before payoffs accrue. For instance, donors can make multiple non-refundable contributions to a public good, lobbies repeatedly engage in rent-seeking activities to influence a policy decision, 1 and duopolists can add to their previous stock of output before the market clears. Such games have two main features: (i) Before payoffs occur, agents have multiple opportunities to vary their strategic variable and to observe their opponent's most recent strategy choice; but (ii) they can only accumulate their strategic variable over time.
With some exceptions discussed below, studies of such games have assumed that agents make their choices once and that they interact either in a standard CournotNash or Stackelberg fashion. While these modeling approaches provide valuable insights into the nature of agents' choices and the equilibrium outcomes, a more realistic specification of such games should embody the two elements discussed above. Our objectives in this paper are to determine the consequences of the possibility of ''strategic accumulation'' for a large set of games, and to examine the implications in a variety of applications. The contribution of this paper is twofold: On the technical side, we are able to solve this set of games in a unified manner thus allowing us to highlight the common themes; and, on the application side, we show how some predictions of previously analyzed models might change dramatically once we account for the dynamics and irreversibility of initial actions. As a byproduct, our study also allows us to identify the environments where leadership roles arise endogenously.
A brief preview of our main findings and the organization of our paper are as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Two agents are present whose preferences and strategy spaces are common knowledge. Agents simultaneously make initial choices, and, after these are observed, simultaneously choose whether to increase their strategic variable. Payoffs depend on the accumulated values.
In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium set. We show that the equilibrium set can be delineated using the standard one-period reaction functions and the standard Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes. This characterization provides a convenient program for identifying the equilibrium possibilities in different scenarios.
Next we focus on when the Cournot-Nash outcome is the unique equilibrium. The necessary and sufficient condition is simply that each agent's standard Stackelbergleader choice is less than his Cournot-Nash amount. This finding provides insight into the nature of the accumulation game. An example with this outcome is the standard model of private contributions to a public good where agents would like to free ride. A standard Stackelberg leader would free ride by committing to a low contribution-below the Cournot-Nash amount-knowing that this would induce a relatively high contribution by the follower. If, however, the Stackelberg leader could contribute again along with the ''follower,'' then the leader's incentive to do so would lead back to the Cournot-Nash outcome. This intuition holds generally in this case thereby ruling out all but the Cournot-Nash outcome.
In other settings, equilibria in the accumulation game are equivalent to one or both of the standard Stackelberg outcomes. An example is duopoly quantity competition by producers of complements. Here initial choice of the standard Stackelberg leader's amount constitutes a credible commitment to maintaining that output because it exceeds the Cournot-Nash quantity (and this initial choice is an equilibrium strategy). The other possibility is to have a continuum of equilibria along one or both agents' (standard) reaction functions between the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes. Here equilibria with ''partial leadership'' arise. Both agents take their actions in the initial period, the ''partial follower'' making a commitment that limits the cost of being a follower in these cases.
In Section 4, we provide some specific applications. In Section 5, we examine the effects of discounting which is not an element of the basic model. The noteworthy finding here is that (even slight) discounting eliminates the possibility of the continuum of equilibria, but two modified Stackelberg and the second-period Cournot-Nash outcomes remain as the only possible equilibria. The outcome that prevails in equilibrium however depends on the underlying game structure as well as the discount rate.
Settings also exist where agents can only reduce their earlier choices over time. Duopolists competing in price may be bound to no higher than preannounced prices to keep customer goodwill and/or to avoid antitrust scrutiny. Political candidates announcing preferred tax rates may face prohibitive political costs of then favoring higher rates, but not so for lower rates. Not surprisingly, our techniques and results for the accumulation game can be applied to the ''decumulation game'' by an appropriate change of variables, which we demonstrate in Section 6. We also consider an extension to an arbitrary number of periods in Section 6, where we show that, with no discounting, adding more periods to the accumulation game changes neither the equilibrium set nor agents' payoffs. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. The appendix contains all proofs.
Before proceeding, we relate and distinguish our paper from closely related previous work. Saloner [18] solves the duopoly output game of producers of a homogeneous product with two production periods, which is a special case of the problem we study. Pal [16] extends Saloner's analysis by introducing cost changes over time. 2 Our analysis of discounting is close to his, though ours applies to a much wider range of cases and thus yields novel insights. We further discuss this point in Section 5. More recently, Henkel [10] examines the value of partial commitment by the first-mover. Our model differs from his in that we allow both agents to move initially and then both agents can revise their initial decisions. In Romano and Yildirim [17] , using a fairly general utility function, we analyze a two-period contribution game to a public good to determine the role of announcements in fundraising activities. One version of the contribution game we studied is a special case of the problem analyzed here. Admati and Perry [1] investigate the conditions under which two agents can complete a jointly valued discrete project when they take turns making contributions toward its completion. Our model can be applied to a similar problem but with continuous public good and where each party can contribute each period. 3 Marx and Matthews [15] consider a more general model along the lines of
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2 Also, building on Saloner's work, Maggi [14] examines the equilibrium sizes of firms when there is demand uncertainty and early investment to gain leadership is possible. 3 Varian [23] also considers sequential contributions to a continuous public good assuming each agent can contribute only once, thus facilitating Stackelberg leadership. Our model complements this analysis by highlighting the commitment problem when multiple contributions are allowed. We discuss this point further below.
Admati and Perry, including allowing agents to contribute in any period. They obtain more ''positive'' results regarding the likely completion of the project and attribute this primarily to the change in timing of the game. 4 As we discuss below, a similar intuition arises in our two-period model with continuous payoff functions. Hamilton and Slutsky [8, 9] , and Van Damme and Hurkens [22] analyze endogenous timing games having firms choose not only how much to produce but also in which period to produce. Our analysis complements this literature by allowing positive production in each period.
The model
Two agents, i ¼ 1; 2, take continuous actions y t i simultaneously in each of two periods, t ¼ 1; 2, before payoffs accrue. 5 The first-period choices are observed before the second-period choices are made. Let Y i y
i denote the cumulative value of agent i's strategic variable. The total action is bounded and agents cannot make negative choices: y Agents receive payoffs at the end of the second period, with payoff or utility function:
Thus, we assume the timing of actions is irrelevant to the payoff function. This is at least a good approximation when payoffs dwarf time costs, as when the period of interaction is short. Also, for applications where actions correspond to one-sided binding commitments, as sometimes with an announced political position, this is the appropriate assumption. In any case, we show in Section 5 that the fundamental results are unchanged with the introduction of discounting. Both utility functions and the action spaces are common knowledge, and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies is the equilibrium concept we adopt.
Our analytical approach employs the standard one-period reaction functions and Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes for the total actions ðY 1 ; Y 2 Þ: Thus, define the reaction function of agent i as:
Let G 0 indicate the one-period Cournot-Nash game and G i indicate the standard Stackelberg game where agent i leads. We write the Cournot-Nash outcome as ðY i ðG 0 Þ; Y j ðG 0 ÞÞ; which occurs at the intersection of the reaction functions.
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4 Gale [7] and Lockwood and Thomas [13] analyze versions of infinitely repeated games of accumulation. Our model differs from their models in two significant ways: First, we consider finitely repeated games. More importantly, while Gale restricts attention to games with positive spillovers between agents and Lockwood and Thomas study only a version of the repeated prisoners' dilemma game, we impose no such restrictions and thus consider more applications. We emphasize that predictions vary widely with the properties of the payoff functions. 5 Where it is obvious by context, assume that i; j ¼ 1; 2, iaj and that t ¼ 1; 2. 6 If the lower bound on y 
We focus here on sufficiently well-behaved games for our analysis and make the following assumptions that hold in many applications. Several remarks are in order. First, the assumptions on U i ðY i ; Y j Þ imply that f i is a continuous and differentiable function. Furthermore, since the strategy set F i is a nonempty compact convex set, these assumptions also imply the existence of a pure strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the one-period game (see, e.g., [6, Theorem 1.2]). Second, the assumptions on U i ðY i ; f j ðY i ÞÞ imply that there is a unique Stackelberg outcome for each agent. 7 The strict quasi-concavity of U i ðY i ; f j ðY i ÞÞ also means that a Stackelberg leader's payoff increases monotonically if we move along the follower's reaction function from any point toward the Stackelberg outcome. Third, while we require the monotonicity of reaction functions in part (b), we show by example in Section 4 that it is not always needed for our results. Note however that the monotonicity of reaction functions does not guarantee the uniqueness of the one-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which we assume in part (c). 8 Based on our assumptions above, we identify 10 qualitatively unique cases as defined by the slopes of the agents' reaction functions and whether each agent's payoff increases or decreases in his rival's strategic variable. 9 For example, duopoly output setters that produce complements have upward sloping reaction functions, each with their payoff increasing in their rival's output. Another case is illustrated by the standard model of voluntary contributions to a public good (see (3) below). Again each agent has a payoff that increases in the other agent's strategic variable, but now with downward sloping reaction functions. We will see that the nature of
7 While the uniqueness of each Stackelberg equilibrium is implied by part (a) of Assumption 1, we state it in part (c) for convenience. 8 See, e.g., Tirole [20, p. 226 ] for a discussion of multiplicity of Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and sufficient conditions to ensure uniqueness. One such condition is that the derivatives of reaction functions are each less than 1 around the intersection points. 9 Three cases have each agent with upward sloping reaction function, one with each agent's payoff increasing in the rival's strategic variable, another with each agent's payoff decreasing in the rival's strategic variable, and the third with one agent's payoff increasing and the other agent's payoff decreasing in the rival's choice. Analogously, three cases exist that have each agent with downward sloping reaction function, and four cases exist with each agent having opposite slopes of their reaction functions. equilibria varies across these cases. All 10 cases have important applications as further discussed below.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we record the following preliminary finding which compares the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
The accumulation game
To determine the set of equilibria, we start with the second period. Upon observing ðy This observation leads us to the following lemma that determines the equilibrium strategies in the second period.
Lemma 1. The following strategies constitute the unique continuation equilibrium strategies in the second period. 
The strategies in Lemma 1 were shown by Saloner [18] to be the equilibrium continuation strategies in his analysis of homogenous good duopolists with two production periods. The appendix shows that these constitute the unique continuation equilibrium strategies in the more general setting here. Saloner [18] does not point out that this strategy is unique in his paper, perhaps taking this as clear.
To present the main finding of the paper, we define the following outcome sets:
j Þ for at least one agentg:
where i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj in each set. Let S denote their intersection:
Together with Lemma 1, the following theorem provides a convenient program for finding equilibrium outcomes in a variety of settings.
Theorem 1.
A ðY i ; Y j Þ pair is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is in S.
The sets that delineate S are based on the usual definitions of reaction functions and the one-shot Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes so Theorem 1 is easy to apply. Note that due to Assumption 1 S is never empty, so Theorem 1 implies existence as well. 10 We illustrate specific applications in Section 4. In general, equilibria described in Theorem 1 will be a subset of the outcomes of those in the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg models and including points on the reaction functions in between. When not the Cournot-Nash outcome, equilibrium will entail an element of leadership by one agent. Even so, one can see from the applications in the next section and from the Proof of Theorem 1 that all actions can occur in the first period for all equilibrium outcomes including the Stackelberg ones, unless the Stackelberg outcomes are the only equilibria. Hence, observing agents taking actions initially and doing nothing later need not imply that they are playing the one-period Cournot-Nash game.
Next we investigate the settings for which the Cournot-Nash outcome is the unique equilibrium. Understanding these cases is important in two ways: First, these are the cases where the irreversibility of early actions is not binding in equilibrium. That is, the same Cournot-Nash outcome would arise if agents could costlessly decrease as well as increase their previous actions in the second period. Second, these are the cases where no agent is able to exercise leadership. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash outcome in 10 Note, too, that the condition in S 5 is rarely constraining. For instance, as we show in Observation B1 in the appendix, when both reaction functions are downward-sloping, the constraint set for the maximization in S 5 is a singleton withỸ i ¼ Y i ðG 0 Þ; and thus the condition is automatically satisfied. One interesting case in which S 5 is binding occurs when firms produce complementary products (see Section 4 for details) and they are sufficiently asymmetric that one Stackelberg outcome Pareto dominates the other. In such a case, S 5 rules out the Pareto-dominated Stackelberg outcome as an equilibrium in the accumulation game, yielding the remaining Stackelberg outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome. Proposition 2 is most easily interpreted by its sufficiency part. Note first that if agent i were to engender an outcome with his leadership, he would take a first period action less than or equal to his one-period Stackelberg amount, Y i ðG i Þ; in equilibrium as required by S 3 : The condition Y i ðG i ÞpY i ðG 0 Þ would then require that agent i be below his reaction function. However, such a low first period action would also give agent i an incentive to add to it in the second period, destroying his leadership commitment. Proposition 2 simply asserts that if the condition Y i ðG i ÞpY i ðG 0 Þ applies to both agents, then neither can exercise a leadership role. Furthermore, Proposition 1 above helps identify the cases for which these conditions are satisfied. We now provide specific applications.
Applications

Private provision of public goods
Consider the standard model of private contributions to a public good where agent i ði ¼ 1; 2Þ allocates his income, I i ; between the numeraire consumption, x i ; and the private contribution, Y i ; to a public good. The utility function is given by
where U i is increasing in its arguments. 
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11 Substituting ðI i À Y i Þ for x i from the budget constraint, observe that utility may be written as a function of ðY i ; Y j Þ: Hence, the assumption of our general model is satisfied. See Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian [3] for an analysis of this voluntary contribution game. 12 In fact, there is a continuum of equilibria here in that any y
for both agents constitutes an equilibrium. However, all equilibria yield the same Cournot-Nash outcome so this multiplicity is not very important.
To gain intuition, suppose that agent i could commit to contributing Y i ðG i Þ in the initial period and to contributing nothing in the second period. Then agent j can do no better than to choose the corresponding follower amount, Y j ðG i Þ; either in the first period or in the second period. But this is not an equilibrium in the accumulation game because agent i would prefer to increase his contribution in the second period, i.e., f i ðY j Þ4Y i ðG i Þ as seen in Fig. 1 . This argument rules out only the Stackelberg outcome. However, if agent i chooses Y i not on his reaction function, then the equilibrium condition in S 3 of Theorem 1 requires that Y i pY i ðG i Þ: Since agent i cannot commit to maintaining Y i ðG i Þ; it is not surprising that he cannot commit to maintaining any lower amount. Both agents must then be on their reaction functions in equilibrium.
In the standard public good game above, Varian [23] shows that the total equilibrium contribution in a Stackelberg game where agents contribute only once is less than the one-period Cournot-Nash total. The dynamic element in the Stackelberg game exacerbates the free-rider problem. Our analysis highlights the difficulty of committing to leadership when multiple contributions are feasible. In fact, if the leader has no mechanism to commit not to increase his contribution later, a first-mover ''advantage'' vanishes in equilibrium. This helps alleviate the additional free-rider problem from sequential moves. This intuition provides a perspective as to why Marx and Mathews [15] find a more ''positive'' result regarding the completion of a joint project than do Admati and Perry [1] as we noted in the Introduction. Now consider another version of contribution games and suppose that two politicians or business leaders contribute to a public good and are concerned mainly about their relative contribution to gain voter or customer goodwill. Let their utility functions be given by Here, a Stackelberg leader would contribute less than the Cournot-Nash amount to soften the competition in the contribution game. By a similar argument to that above, such a first-period contribution is not a credible commitment in the accumulation game, leading to the Cournot-Nash outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome.
Differentiated product duopolists
Consider the following model first proposed by Dixit [4] and also analyzed by Singh and Vives [19] . Duopolists produce differentiated products with inverse demand function for firm i: .
Contribution game with prestige. 13 The example also requires that 2I i 4I j :
has constant average cost m i ; so profits are given by:
Quantities are the strategic variables. Reaction functions are given by:
With a few parameter restrictions, the problem is well-behaved with all the concavity and uniqueness properties satisfying Assumption 1 above.
14 Consider first the accumulation game when products are substitutes, i.e., g40: This case coincides with Saloner's [18] model and is depicted in Fig. 3 . Applying Theorem 1, one can see that S 1 -S 2 -S 3 consists of points on each reaction function between G 0 and G i ; i ¼ 1; 2. The requirements in S 4 and S 5 are not binding, yielding the following set of equilibrium outcomes:
As shown by Saloner, the equilibrium set is comprised of a continuum of points along the reaction functions between and including the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes. As discussed further below, with the exception of the Stackelberg outcomes, both agents necessarily make first-period choices in S and choose zero in the second period.
The case with complements, i.e., go0; is depicted in Fig. 4 . Applying Theorem 1 to the case of symmetric or nearly symmetric agents, one finds that the set S 1 -S 2 -S 3 consists of points on each reaction function between G 0 and G i ; i 14 For example, in the symmetric case b4a À m40 is sufficient. The upper bounds on the quantities can be set arbitrarily high.
requirements of S 4 reduce the candidate equilibrium set to just the two Stackelberg points, G 1 and G 2 : In Fig. 4 , both G 1 and G 2 satisfy S 5 ; since both agents prefer following to leading (see also footnote 10). Thus, only the Stackelberg outcomes are equilibria. The Proof of Theorem 1 (in the appendix) shows that G i ; i ¼ 1; 2, is an equilibrium with y 15, 16 In both the cases of substitutes and complements, producing the Stackelberg output the first period-while the other duopolist produces zero or a low amount-is an equilibrium strategy with a credible commitment to not produce more later. Given duopolist j produces say zero in the first period, engendering the Stackelberg outcome G i is the best that duopolist i can do. With q (Fig. 4) , both agents making initial choices below the Cournot-Nash outputs would lead to the latter in the continuation equilibrium. Either agent prefers to increase output the first period and effect his leadership outcome. If leadership in the sense of ending up on the other's reaction function is to result, it is best to choose the Stackelberg 15 G i also arises as an equilibrium with the same choices by agent i and a set of ''low'' choices y
This multiplicity is again not very important since the final outcomes, including payoffs, are invariant. 16 Near symmetry simply guarantees that S 5 will not rule out one Stackelberg equilibrium.
leadership amount initially. Hence, only the Stackelberg equilibria arise in the case of complements.
In the case of substitutes (Fig. 3) , other equilibria arise with ''partial-'' or ''limitedleadership.'' Here agents do not like to follow, i.e., their payoffs rise moving from their Stackelberg follower's point along their reaction function to the Cournot-Nash point. By committing initially to an output in this range, the partial follower engenders the corresponding point on his reaction function as the equilibrium. The partial leader does best by choosing in the first period the corresponding output (with both choosing zero in the second-period continuation equilibrium). Given the partial leader's first-period choice, the partial follower is actually indifferent to choosing any output level up to the point on his reaction function, the continuation equilibrium at the same point on the partial follower's reaction function in any case. However, choosing less than the level on his reaction function would allow the partial leader to increase output the first period and move toward his Stackelberg leadership point in the continuation equilibrium. Both making choices on the partial follower's reaction function in the first period constitute the only equilibrium choices with partial leadership in the two-period game, the partial follower's equilibrium choice curtailing the effects of the other agent's leadership.
A rent-seeking model
Consider the following stylized rent-seeking model first developed by Tullock [21] . Two risk-neutral parties have opposed interests over a binary decision of a policy maker and take actions to influence that decision. Examples of such decisions include awarding of monopoly rights or government contracts, or passing of disputed legislation. Rent-seeking activities might take the form of political lobbying, bribes, or campaign contributions to political candidates. Party i attaches a positive value equal to I i if the decision is in its favor and zero otherwise. The likelihood of party i's winning is given by:
where Y i X0 and denotes i's rent seeking expenditures or effort. Thus party i has payoff function:
From here, party i's reaction function can be found as: Although most analyses of this model have used the simultaneous-move assumption and focused on the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Linster [12] for one examines the Stackelberg alternative and compares the resulting outcomes. 
When I 1 ¼ I 2 the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria coincide. We analyze the more interesting case with I 1 4I 2 depicted in Fig. 5 . In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, since P 1 ð:Þ41=2; we call party 1 the favorite, and 2 the ''underdog'' using Dixit's [5] terminology. 18 Although it would not undermine our results, we avoid corner Stackelberg outcomes by assuming I 2 4I 1 =2: Before proceeding, note the following ordering for our asymmetric case: 18 Dixit [5] analyzes an alternative specification of the rent-seeking game. Now consider the two-period accumulation game applied to this model. Although the reaction functions are non-monotonic, Theorem 1 continues to hold. We sketch the argument. Observe that if the game is played in the space ðY 1 ; Y 2 ÞA½I 2 =4; I 1 Â ½0; I 1 =4; the monotonicity of the reaction functions would hold and Theorem 1 could be applied (also redefining agent 1's strategic variable so it has lower bound of zero). The game on the restricted strategy set requires y 19 Hence, the constraint y 1 2 pI 1 =4 is innocuous. Similarly, party 2 would never want to increase Y 2 above I 1 =4 in the second period. 20 Requiring that party 1 choose at least I 2 =4 in the first period is also harmless. If y Applying Theorem 1 then, the equilibrium set is given by:
First, observe that the Stackelberg outcome where the ''underdog'' leads cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. In the case depicted in Fig. 5 , if the underdog were to choose his Stackelberg leadership amount the first period, then the equilibrium would have the ''favorite'' choose his Stackelberg leadership amount the first period too, and second-period choices would lead to the favorite's Stackelberg-leadership outcome. The underdog cannot lead because his incentive is to increase effort in the second period. This is in sharp contrast to Baik and Shogren [2] and Leininger [11] . They find that the underdog-leadership outcome is the unique equilibrium if each party can take action in only one of two periods, and they initially and publicly commit to their period of action. 21 If a commitment to taking action only once is infeasible, then the outcome is very different.
The continuum of equilibria that arises in this case of the accumulation game is similar to that which arises in Saloner's problem. In the next section, we will see that discounting eliminates the possibility of a continuum, while preserving either the Cournot-Nash or one or both (modified) leadership outcomes as equilibria.
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19 This follows because U 2 ðf 1 ðY 2 Þ; Y 2 Þ is concave in Y 2 in this problem. 20 We should probably note that constraining Y 2 more tightly to not exceed I 2 =4 is also innocuous. The argument goes through for either restriction, the key being that 2's standard reaction function is unconstrained. 21 This is an application of ''the observable delay game'' of Hamilton and Slutsky [8] .
We find in the rent-seeking example that the possibility of early actions works to the advantage of the favorite in the sense that this introduces equilibria with his leadership. More generally, we have shown that whether equilibrium has leadership or not is endogenous to the setting.
Discounting
Until now we have assumed that the cost of action remains constant across periods, i.e., there is no discounting. This is appropriate when initial actions constitute only committed minima or, as an approximation, when period lengths are short. In such cases, only strategic considerations determine when agents take actions in equilibrium. If there is discounting, however, the previous analysis needs to be modified. Let rX0 be the discount rate. To allow for (possible) income effects, we explicitly introduce the numeraire good consumption, x i ; into the utility function, denoted here
and assume without loss of generality that
In the second period, agent i solves
where I i is agent i's second-period income. 
where f i ðY j jĨ i Þ denotes agent i's one-period reaction function, conditional on the adjusted income.
Given (5.1) and letting Y i ðG 0 jĨ i ;Ĩ j Þ denote the one-period Cournot-Nash outcome conditional on the adjusted incomes, we can state the following variant of Lemma 1 for the discounting case: where we find it more convenient to make the dependence on the choices ðy (1) there is the intertemporal substitution effect, as taking an early action is now costlier; and (2) there is the income effect, as taking an early action reduces the adjusted income, which may in turn shift the one-period reaction function. The latter effect is not present, however, in settings where agents have quasi-linear utility functions:
This is because, in such settings, the one-period reaction function and thus the Cournot-Nash outcome are independent of the adjusted income. While it is conceivable that agents might possess quasi-linear utilities in many interesting applications, such utilities are typical for firms in duopoly games. 23 In what follows, we allow for income effects, but place an assumption on their sign, which is to be satisfied in many (if not most) cases, including cases with no income effects.
To motivate Assumption 2 below, in ½P 
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23 For instance, consider an output game with constant marginal cost and one-period profit function:
where Q i is measured so that marginal cost is one and P i ð:Þ is inverse demand. Defining x i I i À Q i as the numeraire good for arbitrary I i ; one can re-write the profit function as ; respectively. Given our assumption that the continuation equilibrium is at the Cournot-Nash outcome, neither constraint binds implying l 1 ¼ l 2 ¼ 0:
The first term on the r.h.s. of (14) represents the negative substitution effect. The second term comes from the income effect, as an increase in y 1 i reduces i's adjusted income. As observed above, when agents have quasi-linear utility functions, there is no income effect and thus the second term vanishes. This implies that the expression in (14) has a negative sign in such cases. Intuitively, these are the cases where the discounting introduces only the cost allocation incentive across periods. When there is an income effect however, the sign of (14) will continue to be negative unless this effect is positive and sufficiently large. For simplicity, we make the following assumption, the first part holding trivially in cases without income effects and holding as well in many cases with income effects: Part (a) of Assumption 2 implies that if agent i knows that the equilibrium will be at a Cournot-Nash point, then he will shift all his action to the second and less costly period. As we will see below, this puts additional burden on being a leader. 24 The normality assumption in part (b) implies that the one-period reaction function shifts downward with a decrease in the adjusted income. Theorem 2 implies that any equilibrium must either be the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with all actions in the second period, or a variant of a Stackelberg equilibrium with marginal action cost of 1 þ r: Since y 1 j ¼ 0 in both types of equilibria, agent i must be indifferent between the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the r-dependent leadership equilibrium if both types are to arise, obviously implying either Type I or Type II equilibria arise generically. 25 The Proof of Theorem 2 shows
24 When Assumption 2 is violated, agent i would like to take his action early on. This case can be analyzed using similar techniques. 25 Existence is easy to show given our restrictions to well-behaved cases.
that a necessary condition for Type II equilibrium is that y
To make a credible commitment to being the leader, agent i has to take sufficiently large initial action. This reinforces our previous finding in Proposition 2 that gaining leadership requires some minimal initial commitment. In fact, we can state the following corollary to Proposition 2: 26 Corollary 1. If Assumption 2 holds and Y i ðG i j rÞpY i ðG 0 j 0; 0Þ for both agents, then the unique equilibrium is the Cournot-Nash outcome with all actions in the second period.
Theorem 2 also implies that both agents' taking positive actions early on cannot be part of an equilibrium. The reason why one agent might take early action when it is more costly is to gain a leadership advantage. Given that one agent does so, it is best for the other to follow by shifting all his action to the less costly period. This rules out the possibility of the continuum of equilibria that we sometimes encountered in the no-discounting case. In cases like Saloner's, all actions must be taken in the first period (except in the pure Stackelberg outcomes). In such cases, given the ''partial'' leader commits to his action, the follower is actually indifferent about when to take action, as there is no cost difference across periods. However, this indifference breaks down with discounting and the follower would postpone all his action to the second and less costly period. This permits at most one equilibrium with player i leading.
Which of the three possible equilibria can prevail depends on the structure of the specific game as well as the discount rate. Given agent j does nothing in the first period, agent i would decide whether to engender the Cournot-Nash outcome in the second period by taking no early action, or to engender the Stackelberg outcome where he leads. For instance, it is clear that if the first-period action is sufficiently costly, this will take away all the benefits of leadership and the Cournot-Nash outcome with actions in the second period will prevail. Being the Stackelberg leader pays off only if the discount rate is small enough. Regardless of how small the discount rate is, however, no agent may attempt to lead since the leadership amount may be insufficient to commit the agent to no future action as without discounting (see Corollary 1 above).
Our analysis of discounting builds on the insightful paper by Pal [16] , who introduces an intertemporal cost differential of production into Saloner's homogenous good duopoly game. Like us, he also notes the disappearance of the continuum of equilibria, and characterizes the three possible equilibria described in Theorem 2 for Saloner's setting. Our analysis, in addition to applying to a larger set of cases including those entailing income effects, highlights the importance of the underlying game structure in predicting the equilibrium outcome as well as the role of the discount rate. Now we illustrate these points in two of our previous applications in Section 4.
26 We thank a referee for this observation.
Consider the symmetric version of the differentiated product duopoly game in Section 4 now with discounting. That is, suppose the first-period production costs ð1 þ rÞm dollars per unit while the cost of production in the second period is m dollars per unit. Since there are no income effects here, Assumption 2 holds trivially. Applying Theorem 2, suppose firm 1 produces nothing in the first period, implying that firm 2 has two options to consider: (a) It can engender the Cournot-Nash outcome by producing only in the second period. That is, we have:
(b) It can engender the Stackelberg outcome by producing in the first period. This yields
Comparing the payoffs, in equilibrium firm 2 would like to lead if and only if ror Ã ;
where r Ã ¼ ða À mÞg 2 2bð2b þ gÞm : However, firm 2 must also satisfy the condition that q 2 ðG 2 j rÞ4q 2 ðG 0 Þ to be the leader as discussed above. This condition is satisfied for ror Ã : When the discount rate is sufficiently small, either Stackelberg equilibrium arises. For r4r Ã ; firms produce only in the second period resulting in the CournotNash outcome. 27 For r ¼ r Ã ; all three equilibria are possible. Recalling the results above with no discounting, we find that discounting eliminates the continuum in the case of substitutes, and, generally, makes the Cournot-Nash outcome more likely. From (16), we see that when the Stackelberg outcome arises, the leader produces less due to the increased cost of producing early.
Now consider the standard model of public good provision, where agents have Cobb-Douglas utility functions:
The one-period reaction functions are given by
where I i is agent i's (second-period) income. Also, the one-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium is
To guarantee this equilibrium is interior, we assume I 1 =2oI 2 o2I 1 :
27 When the goods are substitutes, i.e., g40; our results coincide with Pal [16] .
Turning to the accumulation game with discounting, let I i denote the value of income in the second period. It is easy to see that while the income effect is positive in this example, Assumption 2 still holds. As we argued in Section 4 with r ¼ 0; Y i ðG i j rÞpY i ðG 0 j 0; 0Þ in the standard model of public good provision. Furthermore, since Y i ðG i j rÞ is decreasing in r; we also have Y i ðG i j rÞpY i ðG 0 j 0; 0Þ for any r40: Thus, one can appeal to the Corollary 1 and conclude that the unique equilibrium is the second period Cournot-Nash outcome. Intuitively, if an agent cannot commit to a high enough initial action in the no-discounting setting to exercise leadership, then the same agent will not be able to do so when the initial action is costlier. It is worth noting that unlike the previous example, the underlying game structure of this setting is such that regardless of the discount rate, no Stackelberg outcome arises in equilibrium.
Extensions
The decumulation game
In some two-period settings, agents' first-period decisions may bind them to a maximum final value of their strategic variable. Here decumulation is the only strategic option. For example, two competing political candidates who announce favored tax rates may find themselves effectively bound to supporting no higher rates during a campaign. They might revise their initially announced tax positions downward, while changing platform to support a higher rate would be the kiss of death. Another conceivable example is duopolists competing in prices who can preannounce price. While setting a lower price before transactions take place is an option, increasing price above the pre-announced price may alienate customers and/ or invite antitrust scrutiny. The implied ''decumulation game'' can be readily analyzed within our framework by just redefining strategies and applying results from the accumulation game. We illustrate our point by an example.
Consider again the differentiated duopoly model analyzed in Section 4 above. However, we now assume that firms engage in price competition, and write the demand functions by inverting (5) as 
Suppose that duopolists can pre-announce their prices on ½0; % P i and then engage in price competition where the only strategic option is to reduce the pre-announced price. Here we assume % P i is high enough to be nonconstraining. Now we make the following change of variables:p (20) and (21) 
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Note that the converted model of price competition with actionsp 1 i A½À % P i ; 0; p 2 i A½p 1 i ; 0 and payoffs # P i is the accumulation game played on ½À % P i ; 0 Â ½À % P j ; 0: This game also yields unique Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, as well as satisfying Assumption 1. Furthermore, since @ # P i =@p j ¼ ÀcðÀp i À m i Þ; Proposition 1 implies thatp i ðG i Þpp i ðG 0 Þ for both firms. Applying Theorem 1 or Proposition 2, this further implies that the Cournot-Nash outcome is the unique equilibrium of the modified game. Moreover, by converting the variables back, we conclude that the Cournot-Nash outcome is also the unique equilibrium of the original decumulation game. Interestingly, unlike the quantity competition, no firm can exercise leadership with price competition regardless of whether the products are substitutes or complements, i.e., regardless of the sign of c: Letting Y i denote the price of duopolist i; Fig. 3 
Arbitrary number of periods
Our analysis up to this point has assumed that agents have two periods to accumulate their strategic variables. While this two-period framework has provided valuable insights into the nature of accumulation games, an important question is whether or not the number of periods has any significant impact on agents' equilibrium actions and payoffs. To address this question, we extend the basic model with no discounting presented in Section 3 and let TX2 denote the number of periods. Here we assume that (pure-strategy and subgame-perfect) equilibria exist in every subgame and further that these continuation equilibrium sets are continuous in the state variables. The following is the main result of this section: Proposition 3. Suppose there is no discounting. If a ðY i ; Y j Þ pair is an equilibrium outcome in T periods, then it is also an equilibrium outcome in two periods.
While we are unable to prove points in S necessarily arise as equilibrium outcomes generally, Proposition 3 narrows the search for equilibria in applications. Consider, for example, the standard case of contributing to a public good depicted in Fig. 1 . Recall that S is a singleton, the Cournot-Nash point. It is not difficult to confirm that this outcome arises as an equilibrium when T ¼ 3 by using the techniques in the analysis of the two-period problem to show agent i can do no better than choose 
Concluding remarks
In a number of settings, payoffs depend on the total or final values of agents' strategic variables and agents have multiple opportunities to increase them. Examples are contribution games, rent-seeking games, and a number of duopoly games. We have examined in some detail the two-period, two-player version of this game. With no discounting, we provide a simple program for identifying the equilibrium set that can be applied in a variety of settings. Potential equilibria have outcomes corresponding to the standard Cournot-Nash or Stackelberg equilibria, or sometimes involve more limited leadership. For leadership to arise, it is necessary and sufficient that the Stackelberg-leader action is sufficiently high to commit the leader to no future action. Frequently, only the Cournot-Nash or one or both Stackelberg equivalents arise. We show further how the results extend when there is discounting.
We have also considered two extensions to our basic model. First, we let agents have only the strategic option of decumulating their initial choices. While we have demonstrated that this case is essentially an accumulation game with the appropriate change of variables, we note that the actual equilibrium outcomes of a decumulation game can be markedly different from those of an accumulation game in the original strategic variables. Second, we let agents have more than two periods to accumulate their strategic variables within the no-discounting setup. We show that equilibrium outcomes of the latter game must also be equilibrium outcomes of the two-period game.
Our framework is open to other promising extensions. For one, our analysis can be adapted to cases where one agent can only accumulate his strategic variable while the other agent can only decumulate her strategic variable. The other obvious and important extension is to more than two agents. This is quite complicated because there are as many ''standard'' equilibria as there are agents, N: In addition to the multi-agent Cournot-Nash equilibrium, there are N Stackelberg equilibria, i.e., any number up to N could take action first, with the remaining agents moving second. These extensions await future research. 
ðA:1Þ
In the Stackelberg equilibrium where i leads ðG i Þ; j is on his reaction function whereas i satisfies the following first-order condition: 
